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Design Patent Infringement Needs 
a Free Expression Defense 
I Richard J. PELTZ-STEELE & Ralph D. CLIFFORD
La infracción de patentes de 
diseño necesita una defensa 
de libre expresión
Las patentes de diseño se propagan 
en abundancia en el derecho de la 
propiedad intelectual. Mientras tanto, las 
patentes de diseño enfrentan desafíos 
legales aún inexplorados. Enfocándose 
en la ley estadounidense, este artículo 
postula que las patentes de diseño violan 
los derechos fundamentales si no hay 
una defensa a la infracción fundada en la 
libertad de expresión. Diseño es único 
entre las patentes debido a su capacidad 
expresiva. Por lo tanto, debe acomodarse 
a la libertad de expresión con defensa de 
uso o trato justo, comparable a la ley de 
los derechos de autor.
As elsewhere in the world, design patents 
are propagating copiously in U.S. intellectual 
property law. Notwithstanding their fertility, 
design patents face potentially prohibitive 
and as yet unexplored legal challenges. One 
possibility is that the U.S. Congress might 
lack the very power to authorize design 
patents. Another possibility – our subject 
here, with implications for design patents 
in Europe and around the world – is that 
design patents violate fundamental rights 
if there is not a defense to infringement 
founded in the freedom of expression.
Design patent
Design patents are unique among patents 
because of their expressive capacity. For 
this reason, there must be a free expression 
defense based in public policy and fundamental 
rights, akin to the fair use or fair dealing 
defense in copyright law. The defense would 
ensure that patent law does not subvert legal 
protection for art, commentary, parody, and 
criticism, especially when the subsequent 
user of a patented design is not an economic 
competitor of the design owner. The IP 
trade-off in such cases – the public grant 
of exclusive property rights as reward and 
incentive for continuing productivity and 
ultimate contribution to the public domain 
– is outweighed by the public interest in the 
subsequent use.
A hybrid creature, design patents have 
little in common with utility patents, some 
in common with trademarks, and much in 
common with copyrights. When examining 
the competing public policies of IP and free 
expression, commonalities with copyright 
dominate the analysis because the use of 
a patented design constitutes expression – 
communication of ideas between people 
– in a way that the use of a utility-patented 
thing or process does not. Thus policy 
dictates that when allegedly infringing use 
of a patented design is expressive, the 
infringement analysis must account for 
countervailing free expression norms in a 
way that utility patent infringement need 
not. In U.S. law, the copyright fair use 
doctrine, like its fair dealing and public 
interest relatives in Europe, provides the 
best fit with design patents and should be 
incorporated into design patent law.
The concept of balance between IP, 
authorized by the IP Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, and freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by the U.S. First Amendment, is 
now entrenched in American constitutional 
law. The 1791 absolutist command that 
the government “make no law… abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press,” 
negated neither the 1789 IP Clause nor 
the federal Commerce Clause. But the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the 
need to balance IP and free expression, 
especially through a body of case law in 
copyright in the last century. We focus 
here on copyright law, principally because 
of its shared rationale with design patent 
law under the IP Clause.
In the U.S. Constitution, copyrights exemplify 
the incentive rationale for IP. Copyrights 
are in inherent tension with freedom of 
expression, because the statutory definition 
of that which may be copyrighted requires 
fixation in a tangible medium of expression. An 
author’s or owner’s assertion of copyright, 
for its duration, necessarily subtracts from 
the range of permissible expression for all 
The fair use analysis complements “total concept” and “total feel” approaches 
already known in copyright and design patent.
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others in the society. Copyright law the 
world over recognizes the need for balance 
with free expression. The fair use doctrine 
in U.S. law employs four codified factors: 
the purpose and character of the use, the 
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount 
and substantiality of the use in relation to 
the whole, and the effect of the use on 
market value of the original1.
Parody is especially problematic at the 
juncture of IP and free expression, because 
for a parody to be successful, the author 
must republish enough of the original to 
evoke the resemblance in the perception of 
the audience – even better to create, for a 
moment, the mistaken impression that the 
audience is perceiving the original. At the 
same time, parody is a political tradition, 
so lies at the heart of free expression for 
social commentary. On the latter fair use 
factor, the U.S. Supreme Court observed 
that even when “a lethal parody, like a 
scathing theater review, kills demand for 
the original,” there may be no copyright 
infringement2.
Infringement
U.S. law admits of simultaneous enforcement 
of copyright and design patent. For example, 
the Federal Circuit remanded for trial a 
case involving copyright and design patent 
infringement claims regarding ornamental 
features carved into the plaintiff’s wood 
furniture3. The copyright claim reached 
artistic elements, such as a lion’s paw. 
The design patent claimed the “ornamental 
design for a bed frame.”
It is instructive to compare the analyses, 
which both strive to differentiate the 
utilitarian, as not protected, from the artistic, 
as protected4. Copyrights require originality, 
though upon a trifling threshold, just past 
“sweat of the brow.” As to scope, copyrights 
focus on originality. Expert examination of 
particular features is complemented by a lay 
“total feel” approach. The copyright claim is 
narrative and specific as to scope, as if the 
protected design elements were “writings” in 
the classic sense. Design patents meanwhile 
focus on novelty. The analysis is big-picture, 
appropriate to the examination of ideas, 
as if there were a useful invention at issue. 
Protected content arises in the delta from 
prior art, and a design is otherwise viewed 
as a whole. Both analyses focus infringement 
analysis on similarity, that is, the copying of 
expression or the taking of idea. Neither 
analysis will find infringement without testing 
for some kind of mistake or interchangeability 
from an observer’s perspective.
Copyrights structurally protect free speech, 
both in definitional foundation and in fair 
use defense to infringement. But in design 
patents, free expression is missing in action 
for a number of reasons. First, insofar as 
design patents protect commercial products, 
infringement is likely to involve the misleading 
or false expression of a competitor. Second, 
design patent holders are less likely to 
seek enforcement against a non-commercial 
infringer than against a competitor. Third, 
design patents are still relatively new in 
judicial experience. Unexplored contours 
mean unpredictable outcomes in litigation, 
especially when lay jurors are the deciders, 
so litigation is deterred.
Looking to the defense, the Internet has only 
relatively recently opened up a global market 
for infringing commercial and artistic products 
through new channels of communication 
that expose infringers. Global fair use in 
copyright is still an infant concept; design 
patents have far to go before norms emerge 
around questions as nuanced as the IP-free 
speech balance. Making matters worse, the 
absurd ease with which design patents can be 
attained looks more like the ease of obtaining 
copyright than the infamous arduousness of 
utility patent prosecution. But design patents 
lack the inversely tempering derogation of 
fair use.
Free expression
While there is no body of free expression 
doctrine in design patent law, free expression 
has not been excluded consciously. Its 
omission likely is an oversight, corollary 
to the non-deliberate location of design 
protection in the patent regime (or sui 
generis in the EU) rather than in copyright. 
Had historical tides rested design protection 
in copyright, where it started in 18th-century 
England, there would be little serious 
question today that fair use would pertain 
as a defense. Significantly, free expression 
seems immaterial to the usual case of 
utility-patent infringement, because the 
offense arises in the construction of a 
machine or execution of a process, almost 
always involving no expressive conduct. 
In contrast, the reiteration of a design is 
inherently expressive. Even when design 
patent infringement is accomplished most 
immediately through conduct, such as the 
sale or import of infringing goods, there is a 
free expression dimension to the problem, 
as when copyrights were allegedly infringed 
in a U.S. Supreme Court case concerning 
the re-sale and import of textbooks.5
There is nothing structural about design 
patents that makes them incompatible with 
fair use; to the contrary, the similarity 
between copyrights and design patents 
makes fair use a good fit. Public interest is 
paramount in either case. The defendant in 
a simple case of unfair competition readily 
flunks the fair use test, if the defendant can 
assert expressive interest at all. Cases of 
artistic merit – say an architect designing 
a museum of technology borrowed the 
patented glass staircase of an Apple store6 – 
could be tested for purpose and character 
of use, nature of original, amount and 
substantiality of taking, and effect on the 
market for the original. In fact, the protected 
design might be copyrighted simultaneously 
and subject to fair use analysis just the 
same. The fair use analysis complements 
“total concept” and “total feel” approaches 
already known in copyright and design 
patent. As in copyright, commercial 
gain from subsequent use pushes design 
patent analysis toward infringement, and 
transformation in subsequent iteration 
pushes the analysis away from infringement.
Peace Pretzels
A federal case in 2013, closed upon voluntary 
dismissal without judicial opinion,7 helps to 
demonstrate the need for a fair use defense 
in design patent law. Until the expiration of 
its 14-year term in 2014, patent D423, 184 
protected this “pretzel,” which we call the 
Peace Pretzel:
Plaintiff Friend purchased the design patent 
after the inventor passed away. Friend’s 
attorneys told media that Friend planned 
to start a pretzel business. Meanwhile 
Massachusetts pretzel purveyor Laurel Hill 
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Foods sold pretzel chips in the shape of a 
peace sign. Friend sued Laurel Hill, seeking 
royalties or profits, damages, attorney’s 
fees, and injunction.
A symbol such as the peace sign can qualify 
for copyright insofar as it constitutes a 
graphic work8. For example, the courts 
recognized the copyrightability of a stylized 
letter omega9. Even though the peace 
sign has existed since 1958, a particular 
representation of it still can be copyrighted. 
For instance, Peace Frogs, Inc., claims 
copyrights in various combinations of frogs 
and peace symbols10. The scope of copyright 
reaches the expression not the idea, so 
copyright affords no monopoly over the 
concept of twisting an actual, edible pretzel 
into a peace-sign shape.
But design patent rides to the rescue. The 
“inventor” of the Peace Pretzel did not 
have to worry about the idea-expression 
dichotomy in copyright law; instead, after 
an apparently easy process to claim a design 
patent with little or no scrutiny for qualifying 
novelty, an enforceable monopoly for 
14 years was created. The patent protection 
was not limited to combating commercial 
confusion (trademark), nor to the contents 
of particular artistic expressions (copyright); 
rather, more broadly, the patent precluded 
the making, using, or selling of a pretzel in 
the shape of a peace sign11.
The missing piece in Friend, and the 
unresolved problem in design patent, is 
fair use. In contrast with copyrights, design 
patents lack the structural safeguard of 
the idea-expression dichotomy and are 
not limited in scope to fixed expression. 
At minimum, the generic intermediate 
scrutiny of the U.S. First Amendment, for 
content-neutral government regulations 
that incidentally affect speech, must come 
into play when the violation of a design 
patent is expressive.
Change the defendant to a non-commercial 
user, and Friend takes on a different cast. 
Imagine a city rally for Ukrainian-Russian 
peace at which a sponsoring ethnic bakery 
makes and gives away peace-sign-shaped 
pretzels. Or suppose a German-American 
citizens group decides to counter community 
angst over immigration by uniting persons in 
Oktoberfest beer gardens to dialog over 
homemade peace-sign-shaped pretzels. 
Peace-sign-shaped cookies might offend, 
too, as the diagrams say nothing about 
ingredients. Farther afield, suppose shaped 
pretzels become objets d’art. A latter-
day Andy Warhol or redirected Thomas 
Forsyth might comment on the inequality 
of food distribution around the world, even 
employing bread dough as ironic medium.
Without the structural safeguards and fair 
use defense that shape copyright, design 
patents exclude activists and artists from 
political advocacy and social commentary. If 
design patents can be perverted to freeze out 
this speech, then public policy is left wanting. 
Human dignity is compromised by restraint 
on free expression. The marketplace of 
ideas is hobbled in the attainment of truth. 
With opinion bottled up, self-governance 
is impaired, and the expressive safety valve 
is constricted, putting the society at risk 
of unhealthy volatility. The IP-free speech 
balance is flouted.
Conclusion
In sum, balance between IP and free 
expression requires an affirmative defense 
to design patent infringement. The doctrinal 
similarity between design patent and 
copyright suggests the appropriateness of 
a fair use doctrine. The flexible test may be 
adapted readily to design patent, requiring 
examination of (1) the purpose and 
character of the allegedly infringing making, 
using, offer, or sale, including its commercial 
purpose, or its educational, political, artistic, 
or other noncommercial purpose; (2) the 
nature of the patented design, focusing on 
its points of novel ornamentation; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion 
of design used in relation to the patented 
design as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the allegedly infringing making, use, offer, 
or sale upon the potential market for or 
value of the product or products that bear 
the patented design. It is incumbent on the 
courts to effect such a balance.
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